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Debating Disciplinarity
Robert Post
I am a lawyer, and lawyers have their priors. One is that no question is
innocent. Every question springs from an agenda that determines the range of
acceptable answers. So if I am asked, as I have been for these remarks, “what is
a discipline?” I want to know who is asking and for what purpose.
Sometimes questions of disciplinarity seek criteria for validating the
“eccentric” angle of vision of a particular “intellectual”1 community in
terms of its “methodology,”2 or “subject-matter,”3 or “curriculum,”4 or
shared “purpose.”5 Sometimes questions of disciplinarity express appre-
hension about the “subordinate status” of a colonized discipline,6 or about
the meaning of interdisciplinarity,7 transdisciplinarity,8 or “dedisciplinar-
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2. Gabriel A. Almond et al., “Political Science as a Discipline,” American Political Science
Review 56 (June 1962): 417. See also Roy Harvey Pearce, “American Studies as a Discipline,”
College English 18 (Jan. 1957): 179–86, and Frederick M. Logan, “Is There a Discipline of Art
Education?” Studies in Art Education 4 (Spring 1963): 10–14.
3. Anthony Nemetz, “Religion as an Academic Discipline,” Journal of Higher Education 30
(Apr. 1959): 200.
4. Paul Jay, “Beyond Discipline? Globalization and the Future of English,” PMLA 116 (Jan.
2001): 44.
5. William Randel, “English as a Discipline,” College English 19 (May 1958): 361.
6. James D. Herbert, “Masterdisciplinarity and the ‘Pictorial Turn,’” Art Bulletin 77 (Dec.
1995): 539. See J. M. Balkin, “Interdisciplinarity as Colonization,” Washington and Lee Law
Review 53, no. 3 (1996): 949–70.
7. See Julie Thompson Klein, Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice (Detroit,
1989); Robert L. Scott, “Personal and Institutional Problems Encountered in Being
Interdisciplinary,” in Interdisciplinarity and Higher Education, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans
(University Park, Pa., 1979), pp. 306–27; and Michael McKeon, “The Origins of Interdisciplinary
Studies,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 28 (Autumn 1994): 17–28.
8. See Basarab Nicolescu, Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, trans. Karen-Claire Voss
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ity.”9 And sometimes questions of disciplinarity are meant to initiate the
quest for an “indiscipline”10 that will adequately express an “antiprofes-
sionalism” hostile to “the institutional structures by means of which the
various academic disciplines establish and extend their territorial claims.”11
Disciplinarity is a fact of life for every American university; its influence
is everywhere and is inescapable. Debates about disciplinarity are corre-
spondingly pervasive. In this essay I shall outline the stakes involved in
three common but distinct kinds of controversies about the meaning of
disciplinarity: the stakes in the first controversy are about how universities
can best accomplish their research missions; the stakes in the second con-
cern the scope of autonomy that universities may properly assert against
external forces of political and social control; and the stakes in the third
turn on the articulation and enactment of professional solidarity and iden-
tity. The question of disciplinarity arises in all three kinds of controversies,
but the implications of the question differ in each.
Disciplinary debates cannot be analyzed without understanding how
disciplines actually function in contemporary American universities. “Ac-
cording to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘discipline’ pertained to the dis-
(Albany, N.Y., 2002), and Transdisciplinarity: Joint Problem Solving among Science, Technology,
and Society, ed. Klein et al. (Basel, 2001). To transdisciplinarity, we might also add concerns
with “multidisciplinarity” and “crossdisciplinarity” (Carl R. Hausman, “Introduction:
Disciplinarity or Interdisciplinarity?” in Interdisciplinarity and Higher Education, p. 10).
9. Clifford Siskin, “Gender, Sublimity, Culture: Retheorizing Disciplinary Desire,”
Eighteenth-Century Studies 28 (Autumn 1994): 38.
10. W. J. T. Mitchell, “Interdisciplinarity and Visual Culture,” Art Bulletin 77 (Dec. 1995):
541; hereafter abbreviated “I.”
11. Stanley Fish, “Being Interdisciplinary Is So Very Hard to Do,” Profession (1989): 15. See
also Fish, Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change (Oxford, 1995).
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ciple or scholar, while ‘doctrine’ was the property of the doctor or teacher.
As a result, ‘discipline’ has been associated with practice or exercise and
‘doctrine’ with abstract theory.”12 When we speak of a discipline, therefore,
we speak not merely of a body of knowledge but also of a set of practices by
which that knowledge is acquired, confirmed, implemented, preserved,
and reproduced.13 Disciplines “mark the point at which” this knowledge
and these practices “are institutionalized, or, so to speak, the word is made
flesh.”14
Disciplines differ in how they institutionalize knowledge. “Disciplines
vary in the ways they structure themselves, establish identities, maintain
boundaries, regulate and reward practitioners, manage consensus and dis-
sent, and communicate.”15 Disciplines also differ in the internal coherence
of their methodology and subject matter. To invoke the authority of a
discipline, however, is nevertheless to appeal to what Kant might call the
regulative idea16 of a unitary and “formalized method of knowing and
expressing the knowledge of a given subject-matter.”17 Any literate mem-
ber of the American academy fully appreciates the authority of such an
appeal. And yet, of course, most of us also realize that “the notion of
disciplinary unity is triply false: minimizing or denying differences that
exist across the plurality of specialties grouped loosely under a single dis-
ciplinary label, undervaluing connections across specialties of separate dis-
ciplines, and discounting the frequency and impact of cross-disciplinary
influences.”18
Disciplines differ from professions in that disciplines refer primarily to
12. David R. Shumway and Ellen Messer-Davidow, “Disciplinarity: An Introduction,” Poetics
Today 12 (Summer 1991): 202. “What distinguishes disciplines from one another is the manner in
which they formulate their questions, how they define the content of their domains and organize
that content conceptually, and the principles of discovery and verification that constitute the ground
rules for creating and testing knowledge in their fields” (Lee S. Shulman, “Disciplines of Inquiry
in Education: An Overview,” Educational Researcher 10 [June–July 1981]: 6).
13. “To call a field a ‘discipline’ is to suggest that it is not dependent on mere doctrine and
that its authority does not derive from the writings of an individual or a school, but rather from
generally accepted methods and truths” (Shumway and Messer-Davidow, “Disciplinarity,” p.
202).
14. Steve Fuller, “Disciplinary Boundaries and the Rhetoric of the Social Sciences,” Poetics
Today 12 (Summer 1991): 302.
15. Klein, “A Conceptual Vocabulary of Interdisciplinary Science,” in Practising
Interdisciplinarity, ed. Peter Weingart and Nico Stehr (Toronto, 2000), p. 18.
16. The regulative idea of a discipline would be the “imaginary focus from which the
concepts” of the discipline “seem to proceed, even though there is nothing knowable at that
focus” (J. N. Findlay, Kant and the Transcendental Object: A Hermeneutic Study [Oxford, 1981],
p. 241).
17. Pearce adds tellingly that “its form, to be valid and authentic, must reflect the form of
its subject-matter” (Pearce, “American Studies as a Discipline,” p. 181).
18. Klein, “Blurring, Cracking, and Crossing: Permeation and the Fracturing of Discipline,”
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forms of knowing that are situated within universities.19 Disciplinarity in-
volves the education, certification, hiring, and promotion of university
professors.20 American universities are now chiefly organized through de-
partments, which “have become the principal bases of power within uni-
versities.”21 Universities hire, promote, and reward faculty chiefly through
departments.22 It is significant, therefore, that “most departments have been
oriented toward and identified in terms of specific disciplines” (“DD,” p. 896).
in Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity, ed. Messer-Davidow, Shumway,
and David J. Sylvan (Charlottesville, Va., 1993), p. 190.
Close scrutiny of epistemological structures reveals that most modern disciplines embrace a
wide range of subspecialties with different features. Unidisciplinary competence is a myth,
because the degree of specialization and the volume of information that fall within the
boundaries of a named academic discipline are larger than any single individual can master.
. . . Consequently meetings of such massive professional organizations as the Modern Lan-
guage Association, the American Anthropological Association, and the American Historical
Association are actually congeries of specialties, some isolated from each other, others
closely related. [Ibid., pp. 188–89]
“Disciplines are shotgun marriages, either of specialities . . . or of multiple and often
conflicting purposes, and are kept together by the reality of the market and the value of the
protection of the market that has been created by employment requirements and expectations”
(Stephen Turner, “What Are Disciplines? And How Is Interdisciplinarity Different?” in
Practising Interdisciplinarity, p. 55).
19. “Common sense identifies the term discipline with the content of an academic
enterprise” (Shumway, “Disciplinarity, Corporatization, and the Crisis: A Dystopian
Narrative,” Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association 32 [Winter–Spring 1999]: 2).
20. So much so that Stephen Turner has defined disciplines as the kind of “collectivities
that include a large proportion of persons holding degrees with the same differentiating
specialization name, which are organized in part into degree-granting units that in part give
degree-granting positions and powers to persons holding these degrees; persons holding
degrees of this particular specialized kind are employed in positions that give degree-granting
powers to them, such that there is an actual exchange of students between different degree-
granting institutions offering degrees in what is understood to be the same specialization”
(Turner, “What Are Disciplines?” p. 47).
21. Robert Straus, “Departments and Disciplines: Stasis and Change,” Science, 30 Nov. 1973,
p. 896; hereafter abbreviated “DD.” “The department remains the basic organizational unit”
(Thomas Bender, “Politics, Intellect, and the American University, 1945–1995,” in American
Academic Culture in Transformation: Fifty Years, Four Disciplines, ed. Bender and Carl E.
Schorske [Princeton, N.J., 1997], p. 46). Thomas Reese notes that in German universities, by
contrast, “the major social unit . . . was the individual chair and its associated structures—the
seminars and the research institute or laboratory. Each unit supported an apprenticeship
grouping, which was composed of advanced students and assistants but not other chairholders”
(Thomas F. Reese, “Mapping Interdisciplinarity,” Art Bulletin 77 [Dec. 1995]: 545; hereafter
abbreviated “MI”).
22. “As political units, departments compete with each other for such sources of power as
funds, space, curriculum prominence, and number of faculty positions; they are also concerned
with distributing duties and responsibilities and with allocating space, equipment, personal
assistance, salary increments, promotions, tenure, and other rewards among their faculty
members” (“DD,” p. 896).
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Questions of disciplinarity are for this reason frequently entangled with ques-
tions of departmental politics. Fields that seek to transcend departments and
disciplines, like women’s studies, have found themselves “disciplined by dis-
ciplines, not only for [their] sources of faculty, but also as a corollary, for
[their] core intellectual frameworks and paradigms.”23
Although the institutionalization of disciplines and the intersubjective
character of disciplinary norms make disciplines resistant to alteration,24
disciplines nevertheless grow and evolve. The practices of disciplines are
continuously adjusting to the changing interests of disciplinary practi-
tioners and to the emergent demands placed on disciplines by exogenous
forces like universities and society at large.25 Disciplines also evolve in
response to the unfolding of their own internal logic. They sometimes
splinter and sometimes merge. Disciplines can be born and they can die.
In America today disciplines possess independent disciplinary institu-
tions that are organized on a national scale. Disciplinary organizations like
the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Asso-
ciation, and the Modern Language Association typically serve to socialize
professors into disciplinary research agendas and disciplinary criteria of
quality.26 Disciplinary organizations tend to standardize departmental in-
struction, training, and research and in this way to facilitate professorial
movement between universities.27
Disciplinary publications are important gatekeepers of disciplinary
norms. Who publishes in which journal or with which press is an impor-
tant indicator of scholarly influence and merit. Virtually all universities
use publications as criteria for institutional hiring and advancement. “The
23. Judith A. Allen and Sally L. Kitch, “Disciplined by Disciplines? The Need for an
Interdisciplinary Research Mission in Women’s Studies,” Feminist Studies 24 (Summer 1998):
293. “Even in the half of all U.S. universities and colleges with joint women’s studies faculty
appointments, the disciplinary department is generally the site of tenure and promotion” (ibid.,
p. 294). For other examples, see Theodore Hershberg, “The Fragmentation of Knowledge and
Practice: University, Private Sector, and Public Sector Perspectives,” in Interdisciplinarity, p. 198.
24. Joseph J. Kockelmans defines a discipline as “a branch of learning or a field of study
characterized by a body of intersubjectively acceptable knowledge, pertaining to a well-defined
realm of entities, systematically established on the basis of generally accepted principles with
the help of methodical rules or procedures; e.g., mathematics, chemistry, history” (Kockelmans,
“Why Interdisciplinarity?” in Interdisciplinarity and Higher Education, p. 127).
25. See Stephen Toulmin, The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts, vol. 1 of Human
Understanding (Princeton, N.J., 1972), p. 154.
26. See ibid., p. 274. See also Maureen Daly Goggin, “Composing a Discipline: The Role of
Scholarly Journals in the Disciplinary Emergence of Rhetoric and Composition since 1950,”
Rhetoric Review 15 (Spring 1997): 322–48.
27. Reese argues that “although academics belong to several communities (discipline,
academic profession, university enterprise, and national academic system), the culture of the
discipline, especially in the United States, generally has the strongest bonding power because it
is often easier to leave the institution than the discipline” (“MI,” p. 544).
Critical Inquiry / Summer 2009 753
institutional structure of scholarly journals serves to reinforce disciplinary
hierarchies: at the lowest level, the evaluator, reader, or reviewer is implic-
itly considered to be qualified to make judgments about a contribution at
a level above that of the contributor himself. From there the hierarchy
extends to the editorship, and the selection processes for filling the inter-
vening positions evidently reinforce the hierarchizing and orthodoxy of
the discipline in question.”28
Disciplines and universities are thus symbiotically interconnected. Dis-
ciplinary institutions and networks entrench the norms by which univer-
sities hire and evaluate professors, but universities hire the faculty who
populate disciplinary institutions and who perpetuate disciplinary knowl-
edge and practices through departments.
This sketch of the contemporary status of disciplines suggests the first
and probably most common class of disciplinary debates. We can expect
controversy whenever the institutional and normative structure of a dis-
cipline conflicts with the functional mission of universities.
Modern American universities serve many functions, but undoubtedly
the two most important are higher education and the production of
knowledge. With respect to the first of these functions, undergraduate
education may be more or less connected to disciplinary practices depend-
ing upon underlying pedagogical goals.29 Most universities prefer to con-
duct undergraduate education through the vehicle of disciplinary training,
however rudimentary. But to the extent that undergraduate education is
conceived in generalist terms that emphasize the inculcation of character
and abstract mental competences, universities must invent institutional
structures other than disciplinary departments to fulfill this function. Be-
cause disciplines are oriented toward the acquisition of knowledge, rather
28. Wolfram W. Swoboda, “Disciplines and Interdisciplinarity: A Historical Perspective,”
in Interdisciplinarity in Higher Education, pp. 78–79. “Gatekeepers, by virtue of their position as
evaluators (editors of journals, referees of manuscripts, reviewers of grant proposals), decide
which work will be presented in public forums and which will languish in obscurity. Upon
cumulative decisions of this kind depend the professional and epistemological selections—who
gets tenured and promoted, which knowledges are advanced and disseminated—that constitute
a disciplinary repertoire” (Messer-Davidow, review of Academic Tribes and Territories:
Intellectual Enquiry and the Cultures of Disciplines by Tony Becher, Interdisciplinarity: History,
Theory, and Practice by Klein, Creative Marginality: Innovation at the Intersections of the Social
Sciences by Mattei Dogan and Robert Pahre, Transforming Knowledge by Elizabeth Minnich,
and Feminist Knowledge: Critique and Construct by Sneja Gunew, Signs 17 [Spring 1992]: 679).
29. The connection between disciplinarity and graduate education is much tighter, at least
to the extent that graduate education is dedicated to producing professors who will be hired by
university departments that are identified with disciplinary practices. As Reese puts it, “to
guarantee respect and secure jobs, there are rigorous methodological initiations in graduate
training followed by admission to guildlike disciplinary and departmental structures” (“MI,” p.
544).
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than the education of undergraduates, the invention of these structures
needn’t strain commitments to disciplinarity. Universities can offer
courses in composition without undue concern about whether the teach-
ing of prose writing is itself a discipline.
Matters are quite otherwise, however, when disciplinary practices con-
flict with the imperative of universities to produce knowledge. Disciplines
in large part exist to produce knowledge, and when universities regard
disciplines as having failed in this objective, tension is certain to ensue.30
This tension is most obviously recurrent in the sciences, which “tend to
work on problems not in disciplines.”31 To the extent that research imper-
atives arising within universities are oriented toward problems that resist
solution within the parameters of traditional disciplinary perspectives,
universities possess incentives to engage in interdisciplinary approaches,32
as can be seen in the recent growth of “environmental science.” This “in-
terdisciplinarity may best be described as a result of opportunism in
knowledge production.”33
If research problems resisting disciplinary solutions are sufficiently sig-
nificant and enduring and if they can be profitably addressed through the
development of genuinely new practices of understanding, the problems
can generate new disciplines, as may be happening now in the fields of
artificial intelligence or cognitive science.34 In such contexts, the question,
What is a discipline? is directed to the creation of knowledge practices that
can solve relevant research problems and to the institutionalization of
these practices in the training of graduate students, the hiring of profes-
sors, the organization of university departments, the establishment of ex-
tramural disciplinary organizations, the creation of scholarly journals, and
so on. As the research agenda of universities evolves, and as the most
effective response to this changing agenda requires the transformation of
knowledge practices, we can expect complementary changes in the inter-
nal organization of universities and in the composition of external disci-
plinary institutions.
Generally speaking, sciences proceed on the basis of what Jürgen Haber-
mas, in his early work, called the “knowledge-constitutive interest” of instru-
30. For a good discussion of how universities shape their disciplinary structure in order to
meet exogenous demands for knowledge, in particular from industrialization, see Swoboda,
“Disciplines and Interdisciplinarity.”
31. Klein, “A Conceptual Vocabulary of Interdisciplinary Science,” p. 13.
32. For a good discussion of this process, see Klein, “Blurring, Cracking, and Crossing.”
33. Weingart, “Interdisciplinarity: The Paradoxical Discourse,” in Practising
Interdisciplinarity, pp. 38, 39. See Hershberg, “The Fragmentation of Knowledge and Practice,”
p. 207.
34. See Klein, “A Conceptual Vocabulary of Interdisciplinary Science,” p. 19.
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mental reason.35 Science seeks pragmatically to predict and control the world.
The humanities, by contrast, typically proceed on the basis of the quite differ-
ent interest of “maintaining the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding in
ordinary-language communication and in action according to common
norms.”36 For this reason the humanities do not solve problems in the same
way as the sciences. Scientific knowledge can be tested against the sharp and
bounded imperatives of prediction and control, but the humanities must in-
stead gratify needs for human meaning, understanding, and cooperation that
are perennially diffuse and unsettled. What counts as knowledge is thus far
more controversial in the humanities than in the sciences.
Nevertheless the humanities, just like the sciences, can face research agen-
das that seem to render traditional disciplines unresponsive, and in such cir-
cumstances the definition of humanities disciplines will come under strain. If
the sciences must organize themselves adequately to react to technological
innovations like the computer, so the humanities must organize themselves
adequately to react to newly emerging needs to comprehend issues like race or
gender, where our desire for “mutual understanding” has for whatever reason
grown particularly urgent. In the sciences this stress has produced the (more
or less) orderly emergence of new disciplines,37 but, strangely enough, this has
not been true for the humanities.
Some literary scholars, for example, sought to respond to the impera-
tive to contextualize cultural texts by changing the “function” of the “dis-
cipline” from “teaching literature, in the conservative Arnoldian sense of
‘the best that was thought and said’” to “engaging students in understand-
ing how our disciplines and culture, as well as our interpretations, are
themselves texts that have been constituted and that have the power and
authority of texts.” The upshot was to produce a new field, now called
35. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston,
1971), p. 135; see esp. pp. 113–40.
36. Ibid., p. 176; see esp. pp. 140–86.
37. See, for example, Hausman, “Disciplinarity or Interdisciplinarity?” p. 8, and Alberto
Cambrosio and Peter Keating, “The Disciplinary Stake: The Case of Chronobiology,” Social
Studies of Science 13 (Aug. 1983): 323–53.
Experimental biology has come to be seen as the most powerful force in the modern recon-
ception of the nature of life and in the radical transformation of medical practice. This
transformation had diverse sources, but none was more telling than the attempt to subject
issues in late-nineteenth century evolutionary and developmental biology to experimental
scrutiny. That general research program led to the emergence of new disciplines such as
embryology, cytology, endocrinology, the reproductive sciences, and genetics, which rapidly
took on lives of their own, independent of evolutionary debates, and produced a wide range
of conceptual and utilitarian triumphs. [Daniel J. Kevles and Gerald L. Geison, “The Exper-
imental Life Sciences in the Twentieth Century,” Osiris 10, 2d ser. (1995): 97]
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cultural studies, which sought to transform “literary study as a discipline”
into “a community where anthropological field work can be done.”38 In
essence, humanities scholars focused on a new subject matter, but they
borrowed existing methodological practices from other disciplines like
anthropology. It thus remains a real question whether the emerging field of
cultural studies is in fact a new discipline or instead is an amalgam of
existing disciplines.39 A similar question bedevils other newly coined areas,
like women’s studies or ethnic studies.40
It is a genuine puzzle why the humanities cannot seem easily to tran-
scend traditional disciplinary methods like the textual exegesis of literary
criticism, the analytics of philosophy, the narratives of history, or the cul-
tural hermeneutics of anthropology. Although “the overblown and over-
sold status of the established disciplines in the field of human and social
studies” has been attacked time and again,41 it has in fact proved surpris-
ingly difficult to generate stable and enduring new disciplinary formations
38. Jeffrey M. Peck, “Advanced Literary Study as Cultural Study: A Redefinition of the
Discipline,” Profession (1985): 51, 53.
39. See, for example, Patrizia Lombardo, “Cultural Studies and Interdisciplinarity,” Critical
Quarterly 34 (Autumn 1992): 3–10. “Cultural studies . . . has emerged in the American academy
as a counter-hegemonic ‘marketing strategy’ for a diverse array of knowledge projects clustered
around politics, identity, media, and critical theory. . . . Cultural studies is an academic
movement” (“I,” p. 541). “Cultural studies is not a discipline; it has no organization, no annual
meeting, and very few departments. Most of the departments that do exist are renamed versions
of other disciplines. Most of the practitioners . . . are in some other discipline: communications,
literature, film studies, anthropology. For the most part, cultural studies is not an institutional
space; it is an interdisciplinary one, an intellectual one” (Ken Wissoker, “Negotiating a Passage
between Disciplinary Borders,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 14 Apr. 2000, p. B5). “One finds
few departments or programs where faculty appointments can be made directly in cultural
studies. Faculty members who do cultural studies are thus required to pass muster both in
departmentally based disciplines and in their freely chosen interdisciplinarity. . . . For all the
intellectual excitement generated by the cultural studies movement, its material base seems
pretty flimsy compared with that of established departments” (Renato Rosaldo, “Whose
Cultural Studies?” American Anthropologist 96 [Sept. 1994]: 525). On “transdisciplinary
academic journals” spawned by the turn toward cultural studies, see David A. Hollinger, “The
Disciplines and the Identity Debates, 1970–1995,” in American Academic Culture in
Transformation, pp. 353–56.
40. See Allen and Kitch, “Disciplined by Disciplines?” Alice Kessler-Harris and Amy
Swerdlow, although arguing that “the conventional wisdom these days, held by both friend and
foe, is that women’s studies has made it as an academic discipline,” also concede that women’s
studies programs “depend on the goodwill of traditional academic departments” and that the
graduate students in such programs “often find themselves choosing research topics that will
win them tenure in their more-traditional disciplines” (Alice Kessler-Harris and Amy
Swerdlow, “Pride and Paradox: Despite Success, Women’s Studies Faces an Uncertain Future,”
Chronicle of Higher Education, 26 Apr. 1996, p. A64). On ethnic studies, see Marjorie Garber,
“Coveting Your Neighbor’s Discipline,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 12 Jan. 2001, p. B9; “I,”
p. 542; and Vincent B. Leitch, “Postmodern Interdisciplinarity,” Profession (2000): 124 –31.
41. Benjamin I. Schwartz, “Presidential Address: Area Studies as a Critical Discipline,”
Journal of Asian Studies 40 (Nov. 1980): 17.
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in the humanities.42 The proliferation of new disciplines in the sciences
depends in part on the fact that new domains of knowledge often require
new techniques of knowledge acquisition, so methodology necessarily
changes in step with the subject matter to be studied. In the humanities, by
contrast, new domains of knowledge are quite regularly assimilated to
traditional disciplinary methods. The persistence of these methods seems
to reflect deeply entrenched modalities through which “the intersubjectiv-
ity of mutual understanding in ordinary-language communication” can
be established.
In truth the humanities in recent years have evidenced a troubled rela-
tionship to disciplinarity. Humanities scholarship seems to embrace an
enduring tendency to reject the “technological expertise” of a “socially
marginal professionalism” in favor of “maintaining a general humanistic
responsibility for the culture as a whole.”43 Questions of expertise make
humanities scholars “anxious,”44 in part because the authority of expertise
42. Vincent Leitch argues, on the basis of “three decades of interdisciplinary work of
various kinds—in a large humanities department, in a small honors great-books program, in a
medium-sized graduate comparative literature program, in a small doctoral program in
philosophy and literature, and in a small graduate concentration in theory and cultural
studies,” that “interdisciplinary work supports or modifies but does not transform—that is,
change— existing disciplines. . . . The origin and end of interdisciplines is the discipline”
(Leitch, “Postmodern Interdisciplinarity,” pp. 126, 125–26). The emerging field of film studies
may be an exception to this generalization; see “I,” p. 541.
43. Terry Eagleton, The Function of Criticism: From “The Spectator” to Post-Structuralism
(London, 1984), pp. 56, 69, 56; hereafter abbreviated FC. On the contrast between literary
criticism as “merely a discipline” and literary criticism “as the site of cultural and moral
pedagogy par excellence,” see S. P. Mohanty, “Radical Teaching, Radical Theory: The
Ambiguous Politics of Meaning,” in Theory in the Classroom, ed. Cary Nelson (Urbana, Ill.,
1986), p. 149. For a good discussion, see Catherine Gallagher, “The History of Literary
Criticism,” in American Academic Culture in Transformation, pp. 151–71.
44. Jonathan Brody Kramnick, “Literary Criticism among the Disciplines,” Eighteenth-
Century Studies 35 (Spring 2002): 356. Kramnick identifies two sources for the “so-called crisis
of literary study.” The first is the “relation between criticism and its public.” The second is the
disciplinary issue of “method, object or knowledge,” which is to say the question of “what is the
object of literary study today and where is its place in the division of knowledge” (ibid., p. 357).
Denial and disavowal are prominent features of graduate programs in the humanities but
perhaps especially so in English, where there is an institutionalized reluctance to admit that
undertaking a PhD in the field constitutes entering a professional arena with rules, guide-
lines, and protocols that may remain unarticulated yet exert an all-powerful force on the
discipline. . . . Professionalization has only recently been acknowledged as the underpinning
of the profession of English at the faculty level, since for many the teaching of English in the
academy still retains a whiff of lofty amateurism or a clubby kind of apprenticeship in liter-
ary appreciation. . . . The conservative version of this antipathy is that professionalization is
crude and destructive and that professionalized students are upstarts. The ostensibly pro-
gressive wing explains its dislike by analogy to an industrial speedup of otherwise leisurely
graduate study. Some find early specialization a threat to graduate education. . . . Neither
form of dislike for professionalization faces the fact that for graduate students to reproduce
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contracts the sphere of potential political influence.45 Politics, as Hannah
Arendt reminds us, concerns belief, and “every claim in the sphere of
human affairs to an absolute truth, whose validity needs no support from
the side of opinion, strikes at the very roots of all politics and all govern-
ments.”46 Politics is for this reason hostile to the prerogatives of disciplin-
ary authority or professionalism.47 In the “public realm” there is only
persuasion, one citizen to another (FC, p. 65).
That is perhaps why humanities scholars who desire to open “intellec-
tual discussion out upon a public sphere”48 are also suspicious of the man-
tle of professionalism and often nostalgically reflect back on the stance of a
“sage’s ‘amateur’ outlook,” when criticism could communicate a “message
about the shape and destiny of a whole culture” (FC, pp. 65, 107).49 But
because this stance is in fundamental tension with the entire disciplinary
apparatus by which humanities scholars are trained, hired, and evaluated,
there is also a natural reluctance to abandon not only the many years of
professional apprenticeship but also the prestige of expert authority. As a
the profession, they must be inducted into it as professionals. [Jennifer Wicke, “I Profess:
Another View of Professionalization,” Profession (2001): 52–53]
45. “The problem of the Victorian man of letters is one which has never ceased to dog the
English critical institution, and is indeed quite unresolved even today: either criticism strives to
justify itself at the bar of public opinion by maintaining a general humanistic responsibility for
the culture as a whole, the amateurism of which will prove increasingly incapacitating as
bourgeois society develops; or it converts itself into a species of technological expertise, thereby
establishing its professional legitimacy at the cost of renouncing any wider social relevance”
(FC, pp. 56–57).
46. Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in
Political Thought (New York, 1968), p. 233.
47. “Seen from the viewpoint of politics, truth has a despotic character.” “The story of the
conflict between truth and politics is an old and complicated one. . . . Throughout history, the
truth-seekers and truthtellers have been aware of the risks of their business; as long as they did
not interfere with the course of the world, they were covered with ridicule, but he who forced
his fellow-citizens to take him seriously by trying to set them free from falsehood and illusion
was in danger of his life: ‘If they could lay hands on [such a] man . . . they would kill him,’ Plato
says in the last sentence of the cave allegory” (ibid., pp. 241, 229).
48. Michael Ryan, “Deconstruction and Radical Teaching,” in The Pedagogical Imperative:
Teaching as a Literary Genre, ed. Barbara Johnson (New Haven, Conn., 1982), p. 46. See Scott
Heller, “Humanists Seek to Regain Their Public Voice,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 7 Apr.
1993, pp. A6–A7, A12–A13.
49. “Within academic English, the conflict between ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ was to
continue, transposed into a quarrel between ‘criticism’ and ‘scholarship’: academic literary
scholarship develops apace from the Victorian period onwards as a technical specialism, while
academic criticism retains some nebulous preoccupation with ‘life’ as well as ‘letters’” (FC, pp.
65–66). In his fine discussion of Raymond Williams, Eagleton modifies the idea of the amateur to that of
an “isolated, dissentient sage” who aspires (but fails) to cross “the frontiers between the academic
institution and political society” (FC, pp. 114, 115).
Critical Inquiry / Summer 2009 759
consequence there is a complementary and recurring tendency to claim for
the humanities a deep expertise after all.
This expertise is often formulated in a very special way that seems de-
signed simultaneously to embrace and to repudiate disciplinarity. The hu-
manities are said to be “disciplines of the imagination,” the repository of a
“learning that disturbs and disrupts . . . that cannot be relied on for ulterior
purposes and yet is wholly necessary for keeping open the options of being
human, that cannot be defended on the grounds of what it is good for
because no one can know what it is good for until it has been explored,
examined, and weighed in each generation.”50
This formulation of disciplinary expertise is internally unstable. Every dis-
cipline must at a minimum be faithful to its own methods and techniques.51 If
the humanities are in fact disciplines, they cannot be disruptive in ways that
undermine the knowledge practices by which their own disciplinarity is de-
fined. This point is not trivial. As disciplines, the humanities must establish
knowledge practices that create a normal science capable of reproduction and
replication in university departments throughout the country.52 They must
establish knowledge practices that yield criteria that can be used to hire, eval-
uate, and promote faculty in university departments and to assess the value of
disciplinary work in the proceedings of disciplinary organizations and publi-
cations. Humanities scholarship cannot subvert these practices without repu-
diating its own disciplinarity.53
Insofar as humanities scholarship is disciplinary, therefore, it cannot be
inherently “subversive” or “intrinsically revolutionary” (“SC,” p. 18). To
imagine humanities scholarship as promiscuously unsettling is to endow it
with a form of authority that is more like that of art than like that of a
discipline. Artistic authority can be inherently subversive and intrinsically
revolutionary because artistic success does not appear to depend upon
either reproducible methodological competence or the approval of estab-
50. Jeffrey L. Sammons, “Squaring the Circle: Observations on Core Curriculum and the
Plight of the Humanities,” Profession (1986): 18, 20; hereafter abbreviated “SC.”
51. To define the humanities in terms of “a refusal of obedience” (“SC,” p. 18) is to define
them in a way that contradicts the root concept of a discipline, which, as the OED instructs us,
is “the orderly conduct and action which result from training” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2d
ed., s.v. “discipline”).
52. See Roger B. M. Cotterrell, “Law and Sociology: Notes on the Constitution and
Confrontations of Disciplines,” Journal of Law and Society 13 (Spring 1986): 9 –34.
53. Of course, humanities scholars can and do debate the substance of these practices. See,
for example, Judith Butler, “Academic Norms, Contemporary Challenges: A Reply to Robert
Post on Academic Freedom,” in Academic Freedom after September 11, ed. Beshara Doumani
(New York, 2006), pp. 117–29. That is quite different, however, from conceptualizing
humanities scholarship as a form of charismatic engagement that altogether transcends the
enabling structure of disciplinary norms.
760 Robert Post / Debating Disciplinarity
lished organizations like universities.54 Artistic authority is also experi-
enced as universal because art purports to speak to all persons in the public
realm about all aspects of human experience. In these respects artistic
authority seems to be the implicit model for those who would conceive
humanities scholarship as an intrinsically revolutionary effort to preserve
the “options of being human.” Certainly the contemporary tendency to
conceptualize critics as artists in their own right is strong evidence in sup-
port of this hypothesis.55
At the heart of this ongoing debate about the status of the humanities is the
question of whether the authority of humanities scholarship is to be regarded
as disciplinary or instead as charismatic, like artistic authority. Those in the
humanities who question professionalism display a strong attraction to char-
ismatic authority. W. J. T. Mitchell accurately characterizes charismatic au-
thority as dependent on a form “of ‘indiscipline,’ of turbulence or
incoherence at the inner and outer boundaries of disciplines. If a discipline is
a way of insuring the continuity of a set of collective practices (technical, social,
professional, etc.), ‘indiscipline’ is a moment of breakage or rupture, when the
continuity is broken and the practice comes into question. To be sure, this
moment of rupture can itself become routinized, as the rapid transformation
of deconstruction from an ‘event’ into a ‘method of interpretation’ demon-
strates” (“I,” p. 541). Mitchell frankly avows his attachment to the “‘anarchist’
moment” of indiscipline, which he explicitly contrasts to less interesting dis-
ciplinary work that derives from the mastery and deployment of routinized
procedures and techniques (“I,” p. 541).
Of course the value of scholarship, ceteris paribus, depends upon the
“wisdom” that an author can bring “to bear on the subject he is treating,”
whether or not “this wisdom derives from the ‘methodology’ of his disci-
pline.”56 And of course great masters of a discipline can be charismatic by
virtue of their remarkable talent. But the tendency of humanities scholars
to disparage scholarship that displays nothing more than disciplinary ac-
complishment is nevertheless striking. Physicists do not dismiss scholar-
ship that is accomplished within the normal and routinized standards of
their discipline. This is because physicists are confident that the ordinary
application of their discipline creates useful and significant knowledge,
and they are comfortable affirming the authority of that knowledge. The
54. The assertion is qualified because I am agnostic about how artistic authority is truly
grounded. See, for example, James F. English, The Economy of Prestige: Prizes, Awards, and the
Circulation of Cultural Value (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).
55. See, for example, Patrick Parrinder, Authors and Authority: English and American
Criticism, 1750–1990 (New York, 1991), pp. 285, 302–3.
56. Schwartz, “The Fetish of the ‘Disciplines,’” Journal of Asian Studies 23 (Aug. 1964): 537.
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disposition of humanists to belittle merely disciplinary scholarship sug-
gests an underlying worry that the humanities do not create useful and
significant knowledge.57 This worry might well stimulate a compensatory
desire to emulate the charismatic authority of the great productions of the
human spirit that humanists typically study.
The question of whether humanities scholarship should invoke disci-
plinary or charismatic authority has a number of implications. One con-
cerns the status of the thousands of ordinary humanities scholars who
teach in universities throughout the country. It is simply implausible to
imagine that these scholars, who mostly perform what may be called nor-
mal science, can be invested with charismatic authority. If their work is to
carry authority, therefore, it must be by virtue of its disciplinarity. To
belittle humanities disciplines is to strip significance from the work of the
vast majority of humanities professors.
A second and less obvious implication concerns the independence that
universities may properly claim against external forces that seek to control
the agenda of humanities scholarship and teaching. It is commonly ac-
knowledged that much contemporary scholarship in the humanities
“seems to flow naturally from the imperatives of left culturalist theory, that
is, from deconstruction, Marxism, feminism, the radical version of neo-
pragmatism, and the new historicism.”58 In the public realm these perspec-
tives have been ruthlessly attacked by a conservative mobilization that for
a time had seized control of all three branches of the federal government.
Higher education has been a persistent target for coordinated assault on
the ground that, according to David Horowitz, “political radicals [have
taken] over academic departments.”59 The assault has been aimed squarely
at humanities departments.
Universities, like all social institutions, are vulnerable to political direc-
tion and regulation. Traditionally, universities have resisted such control
on the ground of academic freedom, which safeguards “freedom of inquiry
and research” and “freedom of teaching within the university or college.”60
57. See Kramnick, “Literary Criticism among the Disciplines.” Edward Said has claimed
there is an embrace of “amateurism” as distinct from “professionalization” in part because
“‘expertise’ in the end has rather little, strictly speaking, to do with knowledge” (Edward W.
Said, Representations of the Intellectual [New York, 1994], pp. 82, 74, 79).
58. Fish, “Being Interdisciplinary Is So Very Hard to Do,” p. 15. See “I,” p. 542; “MI,” p. 548;
and Garber, “Coveting Your Neighbor’s Discipline,” p. B9.
59. Neal SenGupta, “Horowitz Stirs up Crowd in Page,” Duke Chronicle, 8 Mar. 2006, www
.dukechronicle.com/home/index.cfm?eventdisplayArticlePrinterFriendly&uStory_id8aac2013-
b85b-4f16-9739-0337a9788a57
60. American Association of University Professors (AAUP), “1915 Declaration of Principles
on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure,” AAUP Bulletin 1 (Dec. 1915); rpt. in AAUP,
Policy Documents and Report (Washington D.C., 2001), p. 292; hereafter abbreviated “DP.”
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In essence, academic freedom marks the independence that universities
may claim from external forces like those that presently seek to intimidate
and coerce humanities scholars.
Academic freedom represents a bargain that universities have struck
with the public; universities produce knowledge in return for the freedom
prerequisite for the production of that knowledge.61 Academic freedom
presupposes that faculty are experts in the production of knowledge and
that faculty freedom of research and publication must be protected be-
cause “the first condition of progress is complete and unlimited freedom
to pursue inquiry and publish its results” (“DP,” p. 295).62 Academic free-
dom does not imply “that individual teachers should be exempt from all
restraints as to the matter or manner of their utterances, either within or
without the university” (“DP,” p. 300). It implies instead that the “liberty
of the scholar within the university to set forth his conclusions, be they
what they may, is conditioned by their being conclusions gained by a
scholar’s method and held in a scholar’s spirit; that is to say, they must be
the fruits of competent and patient and sincere inquiry” (“DP,” p. 298).63
Academic freedom safeguards “not the absolute freedom of utterance of
the individual scholar, but the absolute freedom of thought, of inquiry, of
discussion and of teaching, of the academic profession” (“DP,” p. 300).
This freedom is protected because the unhindered exercise of professional
expertise is deemed a necessary precondition for the production of knowl-
edge within universities.
The question of whether humanities scholarship should depend upon
disciplinary or charismatic authority has important implications for the
61. For a full discussion, see Robert Post, “The Structure of Academic Freedom,” in
Academic Freedom after September 11, pp. 61–106, and Matthew W. Finkin and Post, For the
Common Good: Principles of American Academic Freedom (New Haven, Conn., 2009),
pp. 29–45.
62. In the words of Arthur Lovejoy, one of the draftsmen of the “Declaration of Principles
on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure”:
The function of seeking new truths will sometimes mean . . . the undermining of widely or
generally accepted beliefs. It is rendered impossible if the work of the investigator is shack-
led by the requirement that his conclusions shall never seriously deviate either from gener-
ally accepted beliefs or from those accepted by the persons, private or official, through
whom society provides the means for the maintenance of universities. . . . Academic free-
dom is, then, a prerequisite condition to the proper prosecution, in an organized and ade-
quately endowed manner, of scientific inquiry. [Arthur O. Lovejoy, “Academic Freedom,”
in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson, 15 vols.
(New York, 1930 –37), 1:384–85]
63. This is why universities routinely judge and evaluate faculty based upon the quality of
their work. If the work is sufficiently poor, faculty will be denied tenure and advancement. This
practice of judgment is inconsistent with any understanding of academic freedom that
enshrines a right to individual expression.
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application of academic freedom. To the extent that humanities scholar-
ship disclaims disciplinary authority, to the extent that it abandons claims
for the expert production of knowledge, it repudiates the traditional jus-
tification for academic freedom. It thus opens itself up to the attack that
right-wing activist Horowitz recently leveled at Duke humanities scholars:
“we hire these professors and give them lifetime jobs because they are
experts. . . . However, these people are not experts.”64
If humanities scholarship does not produce expert knowledge, if it is
merely a vehicle for sage amateurs to advise their fellow citizens, human-
ities scholarship places itself outside the protective shield of academic free-
dom and renders itself vulnerable to the ordinary political recrimination
and reprisal that envelops all citizens who enter the public realm.65 Debates
about the disciplinarity of humanities scholarship thus carry rather large
stakes for the autonomy that humanities scholarship can claim from ex-
ternal political control.
A roughly similar point can be made in the context of classroom teach-
ing. Throughout the country, conservative groups like Students for Aca-
demic Freedom,66 the American Council of Trustees and Alumni
(ACTA),67 and NoIndoctrination.org68 have mobilized in order to attack
what they regard as a “growing political intolerance and abuse of academic
freedom on campus.”69 They especially object to the use of college class-
rooms for the “indoctrination”70 of “politically correct ideas.”71 They argue
64. Quoted in SenGupta, “Horowitz Stirs up Crowd in Page.” “Horowitz attacked specific
Trinity College of Arts and Sciences academic programs and departments as examples of
‘political parties,’ including the Women’s Studies Program, Program of Literature, the
Department of African and African-American Literature and the cultural anthropology
department. ‘Large parts of this University have been subverted by radical, leftist recruiting,’
Horowitz said” (ibid.). The genre is of course widespread. See, for example, John R. Searle,
“The Storm over the University,” review of Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our
Higher Education by Roger Kimball, The Politics of Liberal Education, ed. Darryl L. Gless and
Barbara Herrnstein Smith, and The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education,
ed. Timothy Fuller, New York Review of Books, 6 Dec. 1990, pp. 34–42.
65. Citizens who are not professional academics do not enjoy the prerogative of academic
freedom and are not protected against reprisals by private employers for unpopular public
speech. See Post, “The Structure of Academic Freedom,” pp. 62 n. 10, 73–74, 85. Even faculty are
not protected against reprisals for unpopular public speech insofar as reprisals are directed at





69. ACTA, “Academic Freedom,” www.goacta.org/issues/academic-freedom.cfm?CFID
167605&CFTOKEN8735e6d1837dae87-DC026583-9176-4254-D609B70030EBFEE6
70. Students for Academic Freedom, “Academic Bill of Rights,” studentsforacademicfreedom
.org/abor.html
71. ACTA, “Academic Freedom.” “Students report feeling intimidated by professors and
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that “liberal arts faculties at most universities are politically and philosophi-
cally one-sided, while partisan propagandizing often intrudes into classroom
discourse. . . . Faculty bias is reflected in the curriculum of courses available, in
the manner in which they are taught, in readings assigned for classroom study,
and in discussions only open to one side of a debate.”72
Principles of academic freedom are the primary defense against these ef-
forts to intimidate and censor classroom teaching. These principles protect the
freedom of professors to educate their students in the attainment of “a mature
independence of mind.”73 But these principles also condemn the abuse of
classroom authority to indoctrinate students in ways that are without legiti-
mate pedagogical justification.74 Academic freedom defends the autonomy of
classroom teaching only insofar as such teaching constitutes education rather
than indoctrination. Disciplinary standards offer the most cogent and secure
way to distinguish education from indoctrination.75
Consider, for example, a physics student who refuses to internalize and
apply proper rules for solving differential equations. If we conclude, as we
are likely to do, that such a student is not exercising a mature indepen-
dence of mind but is instead displaying a stubborn refusal to learn, it is
because the discipline of physics understands these aspects of mathematics
to be dogmatic in character. Contrast this physics student to an English
undergraduate who refuses to agree with a professor’s interpretation of
Middlemarch. Whether such an undergraduate is thinking for him- or
herself or instead is stubbornly refusing to learn must depend upon an
appraisal of the quality of his or her own countervailing interpretation of
Middlemarch, an appraisal that is virtually impossible without relevant
disciplinary norms of literary criticism.
fellow students if they question politically correct ideas. . . . What happens when the intellectual
freedom of politically unfashionable colleagues or students is threatened by other professors,
who are protected by tenure and ‘departmental autonomy’? It is important to understand how
dramatically the situation has changed. Professors who once preached objectivity now celebrate
subjectivity. The measure is not truth but power— especially the power of one’s race, class, and
gender. The aim is not to educate the young to think for themselves but to transform them into
‘change agents’ for the professor’s own brand of social engineering” (ibid.).
72. Students for Academic Freedom, “Mission and Strategy,” www.
studentsforacademicfreedom.org/essays/pamphlet.html. For a survey of recent legislative
attempts to regulate classroom teaching, see www.aaup.org/AAUP/GR/ABOR/
legislationsummary.htm
73. University of California, Academic Personnel Manual, §010, www.ucop.edu/acadadv/
acadpers/apm/apm-010.pdf
74. See, for example, AAUP, Statement on the Academic Bill of Rights, www.aaup.org/
AAUP/comm/rep/A/abor.htm; “DP,” pp. 298 –99; and AAUP, “Joint Statement on Rights and
Freedoms of Students,” in AAUP, Policy Documents and Report, p. 262.
75. For a discussion, see Post, “The Structure of Academic Freedom,” pp. 79 – 81.
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This implies that the distinction between education and indoctrination
does not depend upon anything so simple as whether a student is required to
learn or use specific information or facts or theories. The distinction follows
instead from the application of relevant disciplinary standards, which define
the objects and practices of knowledge that legitimate pedagogy aspires to
inculcate. To the extent that humanities scholars repudiate such standards and
purport to speak only as sage amateurs, to the extent that they do not purport
to be communicating expert knowledge but only the views of alert citizens,
they are rendered vulnerable to charges of indoctrination by students who
may be offended by what they perceive to be heuristically irrelevant political
bias.76 The question of whether humanities scholarship depends upon disci-
plinary or charismatic authority will thus have significant implications for the
capacity of universities to maintain independence from external forces seeking
to control the content of pedagogy in the humanities.
It has rightly been said that disciplines must be studied from both an
“external” and an “internal” point of view.77 We have so far considered
how disciplinary debates serve external and systemic functions by mediat-
ing between the university and its ambient environment. We have seen
how disciplinary debates facilitate the ongoing adjustments necessary for
universities to achieve their mission of producing knowledge and how they
mark the boundaries of academic autonomy from extramural supervision.
It is also important, however, to consider disciplinary debates from an
internal perspective and to trace how they serve to articulate and enact
professional solidarity and identity.
Successful disciplines do not merely come at faculty from the outside, as
it were. Faculty typically serve long apprenticeships during which they are
socialized into disciplinary practices. These practices are internalized and
become a kind of “language” in which well-socialized graduate students
learn to express their ambition to produce scholarship.78 In this way a
discipline becomes a “discursive ‘community’”79 in which participants
converse with each other in a common language in the hope of recognition
76. This point needs to be framed delicately because academic freedom to teach does not
protect only the inculcation of professional knowledge. (Academic freedom of research, by
contrast, is justified primarily in terms of the creation of professional knowledge.) As a practical
matter, however, the current political climate means that potentially offensive teaching that is
not defensible as an effort to instill disciplinary knowledge will be exceedingly vulnerable to the
charge of political indoctrination. For a full discussion of these complexities, see Finkin and
Post, For the Common Good, pp. 79–111.
77. Fuller, “Disciplinary Boundaries and the Rhetoric of the Social Sciences,” p. 302.
78. Lynn Hunt, “The Virtues of Disciplinarity,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 28 (Autumn
1994): 2.
79. Rena Lederman, “Towards an Anthropology of Disciplinarity,” Critical Matrix 15
(Summer 2004): 60 n. 3.
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and persuasion.80 The regulative idea of disciplinary unity, which I men-
tioned earlier, refers to the possibility of this conversation, to the implicit
presupposition that disciplinary work will be intelligible and relevant to an
audience of peers who participate in the same discursive community.81
In all these respects a discipline constitutes a community of inquiry pos-
sessing the characteristics of what Alasdair MacIntyre has defined as a “prac-
tice,” which is
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity
are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excel-
lence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form
of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence,
and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are system-
atically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this
sense, nor is throwing a football with skill; but the game of football is,
and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a practice; architecture is.82
Disciplines are coherent and complex forms of human cooperation that
contain standards of excellence. Those who master a discipline can expe-
rience what MacIntyre calls an “internal good,” which is a form of satis-
faction that can arise only from excelling within a practice.83 One cannot
master a practice without training and an apprenticeship:
80. For an excellent recent account that studies disciplinarity in the context of institutions
of peer review and that stresses “the importance of considering self and emotions—in
particular pleasure, saving face, and maintaining one’s self-concept—as part of the investment
that academics make in scholarly evaluation,” see Michèle Lamont, How Professors Think: Inside
the Curious World of Academic Judgment (Cambridge, Mass., 2009).
81. From the perspective of this conversation, it is indeed true that “disciplinary
boundaries are necessary to ongoing research; otherwise one would not know where to begin,
what to find, how to give evidence” (Jacqueline Henkel, “Defining Interdisciplinarity,” PMLA
111 [Mar. 1996]: 279).
82. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind., 1981), p.
175; hereafter abbreviated AV.
83. MacIntyre writes:
There are . . . two kinds of good possibly to be gained by [the practice of] playing chess. On
the one hand there are those goods externally and contingently attached to chess-playing
and to other practices by the accidents of social circumstance . . . such goods as prestige,
status and money. There are always alternative ways for achieving such goods, and their
achievement is never to be had only by engaging in some particular kind of practice. On the
other hand there are the goods internal to the practice of chess which cannot be had in any
way but by playing chess or some other game of that specific kind. We call them internal for
two reasons: first, as I have already suggested, because we can only specify them in terms of
chess or some other game of that specific kind and by means of examples from such games;
. . . and secondly because they can only be identified and recognized by the experience of
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A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules. . . .
To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards
and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is
to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the
standards which currently and partially define the practice. . . . The
standards are not themselves immune from criticism, but none the
less we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the au-
thority of the best standards realized so far. If, on starting to listen to
music, I do not accept my own incapacity to judge correctly, I will
never learn to hear, let alone to appreciate, Bartok’s last quartets. [AV,
p. 177]
Once initiated into the practice of a discipline, scholars can differ about its
standards and their application. Criticism and debate can sometimes be-
come so vigorous that a discipline, like a “living tradition,” can evolve into
“an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument
precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition” (AV, p.
207). Yet, as long as participants continue to argue with each other in the
name of a common discursive community, a discipline can retain its vigor
and integrity. The community is in part held together by a shared pursuit
of the internal good of excellence, by the sheer potential satisfaction of
authoring first-rate literary criticism or an outstanding ethnography or an
elegant mathematical paper.84
These are “pleasures” that can accrue only to those who have fully in-
ternalized the standards by which such success is measured.85 The pleasure
of excellence presupposes an ongoing commitment to the discursive com-
munity that is authorized to define and bestow the attribute of excellence.
It is striking that scholars who attempt interdisciplinary work sometimes
compare the experience to “learning a foreign language and experiencing a
participating in the practice in question. Those who lack the relevant experience are incom-
petent thereby as judges of internal goods. [AV, p. 176]
84. “The qualities that are considered desirable, and those that are to be avoided, vary from
discipline to discipline. The terms commonly used for the purpose of approbation and
disapprobation help to pinpoint disciplinary values and to mark the defining characteristics of
any given field” (Becher, “Disciplinary Discourse,” Studies in Higher Education 12, no. 3 [1987]:
263).
85. Ray P. Bowen, “A Return to the ‘Disciplines,’” Modern Language Journal 26 (Feb. 1942):
101. An important dimension of the crisis of literary studies is no doubt captured by Clifford
Siskin’s offhand observation that “knowledge production today within the traditional
disciplines is no longer experienced—following Wordsworth’s and Mill’s prescription—as
inherently pleasurable” (Siskin, “Gender, Sublimity, Culture,” p. 38).
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foreign culture,” with the greatest benefit being that it “creates a different
relationship to one’s own discipline.”86
Disciplines change and develop for a great many reasons, but no doubt
the most systematic pressure for change is the continuing need to satisfy
the externally driven research agenda of universities. Universities support
disciplines because they produce the kind of knowledge for which there is
demand. The nature of this demand is continuously in flux, sometimes in
abrupt and dramatic ways. If a discipline is to maintain its internal logic
and coherence, it must mediate these demands through the filter of an
established disciplinary culture. When the tension between external de-
mands and internal culture becomes too great, a discipline can divide or
disintegrate. The regular mitosis of scientific disciplines most likely reflects
the rapidly changing rate of external demands that the sciences (particu-
larly the applied sciences) must satisfy.
As scholars within a discipline negotiate the stress of satisfying new
demands, they debate the question of disciplinarity. We have seen that the
stakes of such debates can be characterized instrumentally as a form of
“opportunism in knowledge production.” But our present discussion sug-
gests that this characterization is incomplete. Disciplinary debates are al-
ways also about professional identity and solidarity. They are about the
substantive nature of a disciplinary practice: the kind of discursive com-
munity scholars desire to inhabit; the kind of work that they find most
meaningful and gratifying; the kind of colleagues they wish to recognize as
peers; the forms of disciplinary language that are most suited to scholarly
aspirations. These are deeply important and consequential matters, and
they are all implicated in debates about the meaning of disciplinarity. In
fact, I suspect that they are the fuel for the most intense and heated aspects
of these debates.
Just as disciplines perform multiple functions, so debates about disci-
plinarity can vary in their stakes. They can be coldly instrumental, con-
cerned with organizing knowledge practices so as to most efficiently solve
salient research agendas. Or they can be passionately expressive, con-
cerned with affirming the value and meaning of disciplinary work. It is
important to carefully separate these two kinds of debates, for they differ
fundamentally in character. Both occur regularly throughout the acad-
emy.
There is a third kind of debate, however, that seems primarily situated
86. Hunt, “The Virtues of Disciplinarity,” p. 6. “Scholars,” Wissoker writes, “turn out to
have great affective attachments to the methods of their own fields, even if they spend much of
their academic lives grumbling about them or picking them apart” (Wissoker, “Negotiating a
Passage between Disciplinary Borders,” p. B5).
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in the humanities. This debate concerns disciplinarity as such, and it fo-
cuses on the relative merits of charismatic and disciplinary authority. Al-
though rarely framed in this way, it is a debate that fundamentally
implicates the autonomy that universities may properly claim from the
control of external forces. Academic freedom, which defines the sphere of
the university as independent from such control, extends to the creation of
professional knowledge, which is to say of disciplinary knowledge. It does
not safeguard mere amateurs who wish to contribute to the political de-
velopment of the nation. It would be well to have this consequence in mind
as we seek to understand the concept of disciplinarity in the humanities.
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